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Chilean Intelligence after Pinochet: 
Painstaking Reform of an Inauspicious 
Legacy 
Chile’s intelligence community has been transformed since the military 
dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet ended and the country’s 
transition to democracy began in 1988/1989. Democratic reform of 
intelligence is a tedious and demanding process, given democracy’s call for 
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transparency and accountability, which competes with an intelligence 
community’s vital need for secrecy.1 An emerging democracy, Chile has not 
been insulated from these challenges. As in many other developing 
democracies, the Chilean intelligence agencies continue to be stigmatized 
through association with their earlier abuses during a non-democratic past, 
including the ubiquitous surveillance of real and imagined enemies of the 
Pinochet regime, or, worse, the disappearances and killings of citizens, 
generally for political reasons or financial gain. Under these circumstances, 
Chile has been facing a paradox of how to best balance the effectiveness of 
its post-Pinochet intelligence agencies, long mistrusted by the Chilean 
people, with the transparency and accountability demanded by its citizens 
and politicians required the development of an intelligence culture, namely 
a “set of explicit and implicit attitudes and behaviors related to intelligence 
which influence/determine social perceptions/public opinion on intelligence 
in general, and the intelligence agencies in particular.”2 Other efforts aimed 
at strengthening intelligence openness and accountability, such as formal 
and informal oversight bodies, can help change the public’s perception of 
intelligence agencies. 
Chile has been a slow yet rather successful civil–military relations case; after 
more than two decades of democratization, its democratically elected officials 
have brought the armed forces under democratic civilian control while 
maintaining their military effectiveness.3 Questions remain: Has Chile also 
been a successful case of intelligence democratization?4 Have Chile’s 
intelligence agencies successfully wiped out the stigma associated with the 
former military dictatorship’s ruthless past? Has Chile established both 
transparent and effective intelligence agencies, and fostered the 
development of an intelligence culture in the country? Answering these 
questions starts with a discussion of the historical background of the 
military dictatorship and the role of intelligence in Chile, followed by a 
description of the successive post-Pinochet governments’ efforts toward 
intelligence democratization,5 and finally a discussion on whether or not 
Chile has achieved progress in institutionalizing its intelligence culture.6 
BACKGROUND ON THE NON-DEMOCRATIC REGIME 
Dating from 1925, Chile had been one of the few democracies in Latin and 
South America. But, on 11 September 1973, Chile’s path to democratic 
consolidation was abruptly interrupted by a military coup. President 
Salvador Allende, a Marxist elected by the national congress after a virtual 
three-way standoff in the free and fair election of 1970, died, ostensibly by 
his own hand, in the presidential residence known as La Moneda Palace 
during the insurrection. The following day, the four commanding generals 
of the Armed Forces and Carabineros (the Military Police) established a 
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military junta, which appointed General Pinochet as President.7 This 
marked the beginning of a harsh military rule which lasted until 1990, when 
a new set of free and fair elections occurred, as a result of a prior 
referendum initiated by Pinochet. Chileans were asked if they wanted to 
retain the military rule and Pinochet as President; 55.99 percent voted for 
the restoration of democracy. 
Pinochet’s rule was characterized by grave human rights violations against 
real and imagined regime opponents, including serious limitations of the right 
of association and organization (e.g., banning political parties on grounds of 
ideology); lack of freedom of information and opinion, and severe censorship; 
and repression, such as illegal detention, torture, killings, disappearances, 
expelling citizens from Chile, and/or prohibiting their departure from or 
entry into Chile.8 As one research report observed, “to last as long as 
Pinochet intended, the military regime had not only to neutralize the 
opposition, but to completely destroy it,” which “was a formidable task 
considering that more than 40 percent of the voting population had 
supported Allende’s Popular Unity and 30 percent had supported the 
Christian Democratic party.”9 To achieve this goal, Pinochet needed an 
effective secret police, so he immediately created the Department of 
National Intelligence (DINA), staffed with officers from the three branches 
of Chile’s armed forces, and appointed Colonel Juan Manuel Contreras 
Sepúlveda as director.10 Pinochet trusted Contreras entirely and gave him 
free hand to carry out a bloody repression of real and imagined “enemies” 
of the regime. Under Contreras, DINA became the ultimate prop of the 
Pinochet dictatorship, whose power and influence seemed limitless. Indeed, 
as historian Kevin Ginter notes: 
DINA carried out surveillance, searches and arrests, and operated 
detention centers in which torture and death were commonplace.… 
Contreras’s close personal relationship with Pinochet insured the 
DINA a privileged place in the regime (Contreras met with Pinochet 
every morning at 7:30 to brief him on upcoming DINA activities).11  
Ginter cites a Chilean who commented that three sources of power existed 
in Chile at that time: “God, Pinochet and the DINA.”12 Contreras sought 
total devotion and loyalty from his subordinates; in return, he granted 
them promotions. 
DINA harbored several army officers who conducted the deadly “Caravan 
of Death” in September and October of 1973, whereby a military unit 
traveled through Chile from south to north, gathering and executing 
suspected enemies of the regime.13 DINA also incorporated officers who 
were in charge of the infamous clandestine detention centers, including the 
notorious Villa Grimaldi, where Chile’s current President Michelle 
Bachelet and her mother were tortured. DINA conducted numerous covert 
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operations, under the command of General Pedro Espinosa, Contreras’s 
deputy. The covert operations department consisted of five sections, 
Government Service, Internal, Economics, Psychological Warfare (focused 
on opposition forces within the government and population), and External 
(Foreign Operations).14 As did many other political police forces15 in Latin 
America and Central/Eastern Europe, DINA relied heavily on informants, 
called soplones (whisperers), to spy on the population. As one researcher 
noted, 
Each informant had his or her case officer; each case officer filed reports 
to the section chief of DINA’s estimated 20,000 to 30,000 informants, 
over half of whom held strategic positions in government offices 
throughout Chile. Contreras counted on a multiplier effect to increase 
the network’s effectiveness. The mere suspicion that the person at the 
next desk might be working for DINA was sufficient to extinguish 
griping and political discussion in government offices.16   
By the late 1970s, DINA had become the symbol of the Chilean 
“inquisition”—a state within a state, which effectively conducted state 
terrorism. Carlos Huneeus termed DINA a “resource of sultanistic power” 
for Pinochet that helped create “a state terrorism dynamic as a consequence 
of the radicalization of authoritarianism and of the strengthening of [his] 
power.”17 
By 1977, considerable external and internal pressure had developed, given 
the horrendous human rights abuses, both in country and abroad, in 
particular the assassination in the United States in 1976 of the former 
minister and ambassador under Allende, Orlando Letelier. Pinochet then 
replaced DINA with the National Information Center (CNI), but kept 
Contreras as CNI director for a short time. He promoted him to the rank 
of general and appointed him to a senior position at the Army Engineering 
School, where he stayed until his retirement from the Armed Forces in 
1979. Notwithstanding the name change, the new CNI continued the same 
violent modus operandi that DINA had carried out under Contreras.18 
Moreover, the CNI acquired significant judicial powers, in that it did not 
differentiate between civilians and military officers, and directed military 
tribunals that prosecuted civilians.19 
TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 
Chile initiated its transition to democracy in 1988 when a coalition of the main 
parties opposing Pinochet’s rule—the Christian Democrats, Socialists, 
Radicals, and the Party for Democracy (PPD), known as the Concertación 
de Partidos Por la Democracia, or simply Concertación—won a 
constitutionally authorized plebiscite on whether or not Pinochet should 
AND  COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME  30,  NUMBER  2                                                                                                                         
CHILEAN  INTELLIGENCE  AFTER  PINOCHET  343 
continue to be President for another eight years.20 The vote ended his rule and 
paved the way toward the resumption of democracy, with the first elections 
taking place in December 1989. The Concertación-backed civilian candidate 
Patricio Aylwin, leader of the Christian Democrats, won a majority of 
votes against the candidate supporting the military regime and took office 
in March 1990. 
Yet, after 1989, Chile’s hierarchical military continued to enjoy high 
prerogatives for many years. While Pinochet accepted defeat and had begun 
negotiations with the Concertación regarding the incoming democratic 
government even prior to the scheduled December 1989 elections, the military 
regime enacted last-minute legislation to ensure that the military would 
continue to have a say in the incoming government regarding such matters as 
budgetary guarantees, involvement in politics, and professional autonomy.21 
Pinochet himself remained as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces 
until 1998. Upon retirement, he was entitled by law to a life-long Senate seat 
in the Congress.22 Notwithstanding such challenges, Aylwin’s interim 
government and its successor Presidents endeavored to ensure that Chile 
remain on the path to democracy. An important step for the transformation 
of intelligence was the dismantling of CNI in February 1990. 
POST-TRANSITION DEMOCRATIC REFORM OF INTELLIGENCE 
In the nearly three decades since the 1989 elections and Pinochet’s departure 
from the presidency, Chile has strived to consolidate its democracy, including 
the strengthening of democratic civil–military relations and the reforming of 
intelligence. The process has been extremely long and difficult; for many years 
Chile’s military and military intelligence institutions not only retained the 
stigma associated with their Pinochet-era human rights violations, but they 
emerged from the dictatorship with the highest prerogatives among all 
Latin American nations, raising doubts about the country’s ability to 
successfully democratize. 
Thus, from 1990 to 1993, Chile had no civilian intelligence agency, but the 
three branches of the armed forces and the two police forces had retained 
intelligence roles. On 30 April 1993, more than three years after the CNI 
was dismantled, Law 19212 created the Public Security and Information 
Directorate (DISPI) as an intelligence service, subordinated to the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs. DISPI had analytical but not operational capacities. Its 
main duties were to dismantle left-wing armed groups that had become 
active during the dictatorship and were still operating in the country.23 
Toward this end, DISPI employed dozens of analysts from the left-wing 
parties of the Concertación coalitions, including many formerly exiled 
dissidents who returned to Chile from Eastern Europe and North and 
Latin America upon the dictatorship’s fall from power. The creation of the 
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DISPI has been seen as a success by many observers,24 who have highlighted 
the analysts’ educational levels and the fact that they had not been involved in 
the earlier regime’s criminal activities or human rights violations. Admittedly, 
DISPI’s creation was a success in that it departed from the DINA/CNI model, 
which had carried out abusive practices and employed many illiterate agents. 
But DISPI functioned for only eight years; it was then disbanded and 
replaced by another agency. International security developments prompted 
the country’s decisionmakers to further transform the intelligence sector. The 
successful Islamist terrorist attacks on the United States of 11 September 
2001 (9/11) were an inflection point for the transformation of the Chilean 
intelligence system. The authorities in Santiago began to think more seriously 
about creating an agency focused on combating terrorism. Thus, at the end 
of 2001, President Ricardo Lagos presented a draft law to the Congress in 
which he defined intelligence as “a legitimate and necessary governmental 
mechanism,” asking for a more robust legal basis for intelligence that could 
allow the Chilean services to produce more useful intelligence.25 In October 
2004, under Law 19974, the National Intelligence Agency (ANI) was created 
as DISPI’s legal successor. This reactive rather than proactive pattern 
of decisionmaking is very common in Santiago. In addition, Chilean 
policymakers tend to believe that enacting legislation is a panacea for all 
challenges; they tend to ignore the reality that creating security institutions 
also involves, among other actions, devising a strategic plan, then developing 
political capital, and authorizing human and financial resources. 
The same situation applies to the Ministry of Defense. Chilean officials took 
two decades to undertake a major review and reform of the central institutions 
involved in national security and defense, including the enactment in 2010 of 
the country’s first-ever Law on the Organization and Functioning of the 
Ministry of Defense (MOD) and a meaningful reorganization of the armed 
forces, including structure, personnel, and organization. For many years, the 
Chilean military had been the main obstacle in democratic progress, even 
regarding intelligence, and particularly in the investigation of human rights 
abuses during the dictatorship. For example, the May 1995 decision of the 
Supreme Court to convict both Contreras (seven years), and Espinoza (six 
years) for directing the 1976 assassination of Orlando Letelier in 
Washington, D.C., was not implemented because Contreras did not want to 
serve the sentence. Backed by unruly Army and Navy units, he was able to 
avoid imprisonment for months. He eventually agreed to go to jail (as did 
Espinoza), but not before heated negotiations were conducted between the 
military and the Eduardo Frei administration. These resulted in a 
compromise on the part of the presidency and the use of luxury prison 
facilities reserved for a group of military officers who received a completely 
different treatment from other inmates.26 Ultimately, several years passed 
and two Truth and Reconciliation committees rendered reports before the 
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Armed Forces would allow civilians to investigate the Pinochet regime’s 
human rights abuses. Experience shows that such investigations may not 
only accelerate democratic institution building and democratic consolidation, 
but also boost a defense/security and intelligence culture by restoring a 
population’s trust in a country’s institutions. As Michael Deloach observed: 
By holding accountable those who perpetrated past abuses, truth 
commissions enable societies to distinguish reformed security forces 
from the institutions that carried out past abuses, helping restore 
society’s trust. Moreover, by bringing to light the structures that 
allowed past abuses to be carried out, the findings of truth commissions 
can provide the impetus for institutional reforms.27  
According to other researchers: 
Constitutional and governmental reforms enacted since the early 1980s 
have radically altered Chilean intelligence and security agencies. As 
past abuses and atrocities are investigated and brought to light by the 
international community, especially following the 1999 arrest and 
detainment of Pinochet on charges of human rights crimes, current 
Chilean intelligence agencies seek to distinguish themselves from the 
reputation of their predecessors, despite continuing to hold similarly 
broad powers with limited legal and administrative restraints.28  
REFORMS OF INTELLIGENCE INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK 
According to Article 5 of Law 19974, the Chilean Intelligence System (Sistema 
de Inteligencia del Estado) consists of seven main intelligence bodies: the 
National Intelligence Agency (ANI); the Defense Intelligence Directorate of 
the National Defense Staff (DID); three separate Intelligence Directorates 
of the Armed Forces—DINE, DIRINTA, and DIFA; and the two 
Directorates or Headquarters of Intelligence of the Forces of Public 
Security and Order, with one belonging to the Carabineros (Military Police) 
and the other as part of the Policía de Investigaciones (PDI, Civilian 
Police).29 Their legal framework resides in the Constitution, Law 19974 of 
2004, and the Law on the Organization and Functioning of the Ministry of 
Defense. As noted earlier, the MOD law allows the Ministry to formulate 
public policy over all spectrums of defense policy as well as strategic 
planning, force structure, military policy, and professional military 
education. It also pertains to intelligence, as many intelligence agencies are 
under the umbrella of the Ministry of Defense. The legal framework 
provision also includes legislation on transparency. As such, in April 2009, 
Chile enacted a Law on Public Access to Information (Law 20285), akin to 
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freedom of information act (FOIA) laws everywhere. In line with the 
FOIA law, Chile’s citizens can request information, and government 
institutions are obliged to respond, although Article 38 of Law 19974 states 
that not all the demanded information need be provided due to secrecy 
considerations.30 
The National Intelligence Agency (ANI) 
Currently, each branch of the Chilean military has its own intelligence service, 
which is subordinated only to the appropriate service commander-in-chief 
(Army, Navy, Air Force). But, in the aftermath of the dictatorship, the 
country’s political leadership sought an efficient civilian intelligence agency 
which would centralize all intelligence and be subordinated directly to the 
President. In response, the ANI was finally created in 2004.31 Congress had 
begun debate on establishing an ANI in October 2001, separate from any 
discussion regarding reformation of the military intelligence agencies or 
diminishing their autonomy.32 On paper, the ANI is supposed to 
coordinate the activities of all the country’s intelligence agencies, but in line 
with the law, the military intelligence services remain subordinated solely to 
their leaders.33 Thus, the Army, Navy, and Air Force have continued to 
“determine to a large degree what their intelligence services should do, and 
the ANI simply serves as a vehicle for sharing information.”34 Often, the 
ANI cannot fulfill its mission, due to both the lack of trust among the 
different services and competition among the agencies for attention, budget, 
or human resources. As a result, many have proposed the creation of a 
National Intelligence Director who could exercise authority over the ANI, 
armed forces intelligence, and police intelligence.35 
The ANI was created in 2004 under a veneer of military support. While the 
Army’s intelligence service initially called the ANI “a sign of ‘national 
growth,’” its support eventually faded. Yet, as Gregory Weeks has noted, 
“As long as [ANI] did not encroach on existing military prerogatives no 
effort was made to impede its development.”36 
The ANI has a staff of approximately 100, including the Director, who is 
directly nominated by the President and, according to Article 9 of Law 
19974, can be appointed for a maximum of six years and cannot be 
reappointed until three years after leaving office. The current director, 
Gustavo Villalobos, was Director of the Intelligence Service from 2001 to 
2010, and again since 2014. From a legal perspective, the Chilean law does 
not attribute to ANI any operational capabilities and does not sanction 
espionage; rather, its personnel include handpicked analysts, with the 
majority being journalists, historians, lawyers, sociologists, and 
academicians.37 Nevertheless, the ANI can engage in several kinds of 
intrusive activities, but only if certain information cannot be obtained using 
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open sources of intelligence (OSINT). As such, the ANI can perform four 
different types of procedures, as stipulated in Article 24 of Law 19974: (1) 
the interception of telephone, computer, radio communications, and 
correspondence; (2) the operation of surveillance systems and networks; (3) 
wiretapping and video recording; and (4) the utilizing of any other 
technological systems for the transmission, storage, communication, or 
processing of information.38 Ultimately, however, ANI’s main focus remains 
analysis. Yet it obtains information from such open sources as national and 
international media, data obtained from paid and unpaid informants, and 
all the intelligence received from other security agencies, both domestic and 
foreign. In that sense, Article 8 of Law 19974 stipulates ANI’s main roles 
and mission. These include the dissemination of intelligence to the President 
and other governmental institutions, as determined by the President; the 
protection of critical information; requesting and receiving intelligence from 
the Armed Forces intelligence services, as well as from the police, and other 
state institutions; producing intelligence related to terrorist groups and 
transnational crime; and, counterintelligence.39 ANI’s budget is regulated by 
Article 19 of Law 19974; for the year 2016 it was a total of 8.5 million 
dollars of which 75 percent was to be used for salaries. Its budget also 
included $70,000 as “other sources of income.”40 
The Military Intelligence Agencies 
The Chilean military intelligence has always had a very realistic view vis-à-vis 
threats and given priority to the development of intelligence linked to 
deterrence and interstate conflicts. Law 19974 created four military 
intelligence services. Its Article 20 stipulated that their functions include 
those necessary to detect, neutralize, and counter activities that affect 
national defense, whether from inside or outside the country. 
Article 20 also stipulated that the military intelligence agencies can 
perform “police” intelligence roles, understood as the gathering and 
processing of intelligence by both the Air Force and Navy as part of their 
air and sea policing missions.41 The Ministry of Defense sets the guidelines 
and directives for the military intelligence agencies, while the Chief of Staff 
appoints the head of each of the four services.42 
The Defense Intelligence Directorate of the National Defense Staff (DID— 
Dirección de Inteligencia de la Defensa), created by the Joint Staff43 in 2014, 
was legalized by Ministerial Order 3380 of 24 December 2014. The 
DID comprises four departments: Planning; Intelligence Production; 
Counterintelligence and Security; and, Cyber Defense.44 The DID’s 
creation has not been entirely welcomed by the rest of the Armed Services. 
For instance, the Navy and Air Force expressed their concern regarding 
EMCO’s Army-centered focus, and its little understanding of the in 
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services’ particularities.45 They view the DID as essentially an Army 
institution, with few or no benefits for the Air Force and Navy. Yet, of the 
four military intelligence agencies, the DID actually receives the least 
amount of funding, mainly because it is analysis-centered with its 
information that is often not as complete as it should be coming primarily 
from the intelligence services of the three Armed Forces. 
Police Intelligence 
The Directorates or Headquarters of Intelligence of the Forces of Public 
Security and Order.  The military police intelligence, DIPOLCAR 
(Dirección de Inteligencia Policial de Carabineros) and JIPOL (Jefatura de 
Inteligencia Policial) de la PDI (Civilian Police) channel their activities 
toward the identification of local political violence. The PDI devotes nearly 
300 personnel to countering political violence, while the Carabineros assign 
200.46 In the fall of 2014, as a result of terrorist activities, the Carabineros 
set up a new National Directorate of Intelligence, Drugs, and Criminal 
Investigation (Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia, Drogas e Investigación 
Criminal), aimed at strengthening the investigative activity of the 
Carabineros.47 Both the PDI and the Carabineros have links with ANI, and 
interchange officers who serve as liaisons.48 
Both services are legally regulated by the Organic Law of Carabineros and 
PDI, as well as Article 22 of Law 19974. A principal concern about their 
activities is the absence of a legal regulation to divide their jurisdictions and 
or mechanism to actually define their duties and responsibilities.49 They 
thus have overlapping roles that only the Prosecutor can help prevent. In 
the wake of recent events, especially after the 2014 Metro bombings, both 
forces have asked for an increasingly important role in countering 
terrorism, a move mistrusted by the Military Intelligence services since they 
don’t wish to lose their responsibilities.50 
ESTABLISHING DEMOCRATIC CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT OF THE 
CHILEAN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
The control and oversight of the Chilean intelligence agencies, based on the 
Law 19774 of 2004, is undertaken by the Executive, Legislative, Internal, and 
Judicial branches of government, but only over the ANI, and not over the 
military agencies.51 With regard to military intelligence, the Chief of Staff 
is the only accountable public official, and thus must respond to any 
wrongdoing among the military services. Control and oversight also 
involves informal external oversight by the media and civil society (general 
public), at both the domestic and international levels. 
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Executive Control 
In line with Article 7 of the 19974 Law, executive control is exercised jointly 
by the President and the ANI Director; the ANI directly responds to the 
President; guidance and direction of its activities are the responsibility of 
the Director, who is appointed by the President. 
In addition, executive control is exercised by the Contraloría General de la 
República, akin to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in the 
United States and the Courts of Audits in Europe, a top supervisory body 
of the Chilean administration, regulated by the country’s Constitution. 
Autonomous from the Executive Branch and other public bodies, it 
controls the legality of the activities of state agencies. Contraloría is the 
institution that verifies the legality of the personnel hired by ANI, as well 
as the agency‘s expenditures.52 But Contraloría has no control over the 
fondos reservados, the special funds about which ANI does not have to give 
any explanation and are used to pay informants and other non-public 
operations. Only the ANI Director, who knows the funding allocation, can 
assure the Contraloría of the lack of budgetary illegalities. 
Executive control is also ensured by the director of each military 
intelligence agency. This is a legacy of the military dictatorship whereby 
the military considered itself the only institution capable of defending 
Chile’s interests. 
Internal Control 
Internal control of the intelligence community is ensured by the highest 
ranking official in each agency, known in Chilean parlance as 
“autocontrol.”53 For ANI, the Director controls and assures the legality of 
both the agency and its personnel’s activities, and can hold the staff 
responsible and accountable for any wrongdoing. In the three intelligence 
services of the Armed Forces, the Chief of Staff has this authority. 
Legislative Control and Oversight 
Legislative control and oversight is ensured by an Intelligence Committee 
functioning in the Chamber of Deputies of the Chilean Congress. But the 
Committee is not permanent. In accordance with Article 37 of Law 19974, 
which stipulates the creation of the congressional committee, the ANI 
director must at least annually present a secret report to be reviewed by the 
Committee, also in secret. The members of the Intelligence Oversight 
Committee are sworn to secrecy for life; if they break this oath, the Chilean 
Criminal Code can be invoked against them. The Committee can also 
require information pertaining to their agencies’ performance from the 
Ministers of Internal Affairs and National Defense and from the ANI’s 
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Director. But most of the time the work of the Committee is reactive; the panel 
tends to convene mainly when crises or scandals occur. That is why Carolina 
Sancho has called for the creation of a Permanent Commission of Intelligence 
instead of the Special (non-permanent) Committee that exists today.54 
Legislative oversight can be enhanced if Chile creates the position of 
Ombudsman, a step which is currently underway. Originating in Scandinavia, 
and widely used internationally, the Ombudsman is a public official chosen 
by either the executive or the legislative branch who defends the interests and 
rights of the public. When this institution will be established and what its 
roles and responsibilities will be, is as yet undetermined. 
Judicial Review 
Several different laws articulate Chile’s legal framework for special collection 
procedures. First, in accordance with Law 19974 of 2004, intelligence agencies 
must obtain authorization from judges for special collection activities.55 
While the ANI can engage in the interception of communications and the 
carrying out of video surveillance only under authorization from a minister 
within the Court of Appeal,56 the military and police intelligence leadership 
can legally authorize surveillance, such as operating undercover agents and 
informants, without judicial authorization.57 Law 19974 requires the 
authorization of a “Ministro de Corte,” a judge who approves specific 
intrusive activities and rules on an individual basis in order to guarantee 
fundamental rights. In contrast, Law 20000 of 2005, an antidrug law, 
stipulates that judicial approval for a special collection procedure requires 
only a “Juez de Garantía,” which makes approval for intrusive activities 
easier. Additional special collection legal provisions include those in 
Article 222 and others in the Criminal Procedure Law, as well the Counter 
Terrorist Law 18314 of 1984. 
Informal External Oversight 
In addition to formal control/oversight mechanisms, informal mechanisms 
help expose irregularities or wrongdoing within the intelligence community. 
Informal oversight by the media in particular has often exposed such 
transgressions. 
Several relatively recent “scandals” that were attributed to branches of the 
Military Intelligence, such as the one in 2003, when some Chilean agents 
allegedly stole information from the Argentinian consulate in Punta 
Arenas, Chile. A more recent case involved two Peruvian military personnel 
receiving money from the Chileans in return for information.58 Specific 
details of these operations are known only by the intelligence branches of 
the three institutions and their respective Chiefs of Staff. None of the 
civilian leadership, including the President and the Minister of Defense, 
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were said to be aware of the operations and were only given reports in which 
the information had already been processed into intelligence.59 That case 
initiated a strong debate over not only accountability but also the potential 
politicization of the Armed Forces’ intelligence, referring to the idea that 
the Armed Forces might be acting as a law unto themselves and working 
under the premise that only they know what is good for Chile.60 But public 
concern over such events as spying on the Argentinian consulate in Punta 
Arenas or the 2015 case in which Chile allegedly paid Peruvian military 
informants was either downplayed by the media and the public or 
considered to be a natural outcome of difficult bilateral relations between 
Chile and its neighbors. 
Informal external oversight of the government of Chile has been conducted 
through the authority of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. One 
particular case stands out, that of retired Navy officer Humberto Palamara, 
in 1993. When Palamara tried to publish a book, the Navy seized all the 
copies and put him on trial. He then sought the protection of the Inter- 
American Court of Human Rights, and the court acted in his favor. In 
2006, the Court ruled that Chile had violated the rights of the officer, as 
Russell Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane explained, “by having applied 
prior restraint, having violated the guarantee of due process upon 
illegitimately subjecting Palamara to military jurisdiction, and having 
violated the right to private property by denying him the use and enjoyment 
of his intellectual creation. Beyond paying compensation and allowing the 
publication of the confiscated book, Chile had to bring its military justice 
up to international standards.”61 Chile thus accepted the resolution of a 
multilateral international legal body. 
ANALYSIS OF THE REFORM 
General Inferences 
Chile’s democratic reform of intelligence features an uneasy relationship 
between civilian policymakers and the military. While the civilians have, 
over time, developed successful civil–military relations and a democratic 
defense reform,62 they have not been entirely successful with one particular 
component of civil–military relations: democratic reform of intelligence. While 
the policymakers have reported progress in creating a civilian intelligence 
agency, they are still struggling to achieve an acceptable tradeoff between 
transparency and the effectiveness of the post-dictatorial intelligence agencies 
due to a host of interconnected challenges, many of them emerging from the 
legacy of the past. 
The most pernicious challenge has been overcoming the legacy of the past, 
the “stigma” associated with intelligence agencies’ non-democratic past and 
misconduct, and with a continuation of non-democratic personnel and 
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abusive practices even after the regime change.63 These legacies have resulted 
in the politicization of intelligence. For example, when the DINA was 
abolished in 1990, many of its personnel and informants were absorbed by 
the CNI. Despite its efforts to distinguish itself from the notorious 
Pinochet-era agency, by first and foremost changing its focus from internal 
surveillance to national defense, its harboring of ex-DINA personnel was 
controversial.64 Pinochet-era practices plagued the intelligence sector 
during the first years after the transition to democracy. In 1992, the 
military intelligence spied on various center–right party members. After a 
civilian judge who was supposed to investigate the case remanded it 
instead to the military, the Armed Forces immediately closed the case; 
moreover, when one of the aggrieved politicians continued to exert 
pressure to open the case of abuse by the military, one of his children was 
kidnapped.65 Palamara, for one, in his 2006 book, listed many of the 
Armed Forces’ violations of human rights, including the “use of military 
intelligence services in anti-subversive warfare, and asserted the need for 
certain ethical boundaries.”66 
The various human rights committees formed after Chile’s transition to 
democracy have attempted to counter this legacy of the past though, and 
their endeavors led to the arrest of many DINA/CNI members after the 
demise of the Pinochet regime. Nevertheless, Chile’s military intelligence 
still bears the stigma derived from the long period of dictatorship in which 
it was used as a state mechanism of torture, mass murder, and political 
repression. Delinking the actual need for intelligence from that dismal 
period of Chile’s history has been difficult. That factor has also affected 
and delayed the creation and development of an intelligence culture that 
allows training professionals in several areas of interest. 
The Military’s Objections 
The legacy of the past has had additional negative consequences. The 
military’s continued prerogatives, as well as its resistance to and even 
intimidation of attempts at reforming intelligence, have delayed the 
development of both transparency and effectiveness of the post-Pinochet 
Chilean intelligence community. During the early years of transition, the 
Armed Forces attempted to torpedo any civilian effort to create a 
civilian intelligence agency. Resistance also occurred during the debate on 
creation of the ANI. Most of the military’s pushback was against too 
much presidential control over ANI. The Armed Forces feared that the 
ANI, which was intended to be the “coordinating” intelligence body, 
would not only be too close to the President, but would bring the military 
under the scrutiny of the President, a status the Armed Forces did not 
want. The military instead sought a multilateral control system, 
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paradoxically invoking concern over potential abuse of presidential power.67 
They also opposed the idea of granting operative powers to the ANI.68 
Moreover, the military intelligence invoked Law 19974 and cited the lack 
of training in their academy by ANI personnel. In the military’s view, 
ANI’s civilians, who were not trained in the services’ institutions, were not 
real intelligence professionals. Although civilians are currently included in 
the military intelligence bodies, they are still not considered equals by the 
military officers. As Gregory Weeks has noted, “For years, the military 
had been effectively governing itself, and was viewed as competent in 
terms of organising and running intelligence. The military, however, was 
not amenable to adding civilian oversight.”69 Kevin Ginter pointed out 
that the “power of Chile’s intelligence services to resist reform and greater 
civilian oversight” continued at least until the debate on the creation of 
and legal framework for the ANI in the early 2000s.70 
Under these circumstances, achieving de facto and de jure civilian supremacy 
over intelligence has been cumbersome and sluggish. Despite their initial 
interest in the democratization of intelligence, civilians in and out of 
government had limited authority to impose their will and overstep either 
the prerogatives or the boundaries of the military. But more than a decade 
after the end of the military rule, the members of the Chilean Congress still 
did not have the courage and/or interest to confront the autonomy of 
existing military intelligence bodies, or to enforce any congressional 
oversight on the ANI. They allowed only for presidential accountability.71 
In the fall of 2014, for instance, Chile experienced a terrorist attack in the 
Escuela Militar metro station. Congressman Gustavo Hasbún (UDI- 
Conservative), a member of the Intelligence Committee in Congress, said 
that “the only way to fight terrorism is to give [ANI] capacities to infiltrate 
in criminal groups, thus guaranteeing operative competences.”72 That 
suggestion, which turned into a floor debate, has not yet implemented. 
All of this has resulted in a frail democratic civilian control over 
intelligence. For example, by law, the military and police intelligence 
leadership can still authorize surveillance, such as operating undercover 
agents and informants without judicial authorization, a prerogative secured 
by the military during the ANI law debate.73 This ability questions the 
transparency and accountability of the uniformed services’ intelligence 
agencies. The same doubt can be raised regarding the effectiveness of the 
Congressional oversight of intelligence. In the past, researchers noted that 
the Congress was “shut out of the intelligence process.”74 That situation has 
not changed much either. Since the “terrorist” attack on Escuela Militar, no 
agreement has been reached on whether the ANI should have enhanced 
prerogatives. In addition, other than several media scandals, which drew 
the public’s attention, intelligence has been a low priority for any 
administration. As a result, the Chilean Congress still has little authority 
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over intelligence overall, and does not exercise direct control over the military 
intelligence. This situation reveals a lack of civilian expertise in intelligence 
matters. That knowledge gap has prevented policymakers from having an 
informed opinion on the intelligence and democracy debate or choosing the 
best approaches to intelligence reform. Moreover, the Chilean intelligence 
system remains almost completely unknown to a public that still considers 
the intelligence sector to be a mechanism for repression and the conduct of 
obscure activities. The limited coverage that Chilean newspapers dedicate to 
intelligence matters assures that this topic remains widely unknown.75 
Closing the Gap 
As a consequence, the professionalization of the ANI has been rather slow. 
Chile still does not have an educational institution within the ANI, due in 
part to the military’s initial opposition. Since the Army has its own 
Intelligence Academy, it has relied on hiring civilians primarily as analysts. 
As university graduates, their degree allows them to be contracted as 
intelligence professionals (profesionales) or in management positions 
(directivos).76 
However, the University of Chile’s Department of Political Science and 
Public Affairs Institute, until 2009, offered a Diplomado in analytical 
methods for strategic intelligence, and the Army War College (ACAGUE), 
offered a master’s degree focused on strategic intelligence.77 Likewise, in 
2009, the National Academy of Political and Strategic Studies (ANEPE), 
an institution which provides graduate level education for both military 
officers and civilians, functioning under the umbrella of the Ministry of 
Defense, began a Diplomado program named “The Intelligence Function in 
the Contemporary State” that aimed at fostering an intelligence culture in 
Chile by educating the population on the need and role of intelligence 
in the Chilean democracy.78 As one observer has noted, “intelligence 
education, whether in official government institutions or in universities, has 
professionalized the field, and has attracted the interest of Chile’s academic 
community, setting the intellectual stage for expansive intelligence 
studies.”79 In addition, the DINE has an Intelligence School, operating 
since the mid-1980s, which educates and trains Army, Navy, and Air Force 
intelligence officers. 
Coordination Difficulties 
Under ongoing circumstances, achieving effectiveness in fulfilling intelligence 
roles and missions has been challenging, in particular for the ANI. In 
addition, Chile’s Law 19974 failed to include the Gendarmeria (which is 
responsible for the administration of prisons) in the intelligence 
community. The law stipulated that the ANI may require information 
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from the Gendarmeria, which must comply with the request, thus 
acknowledging the relevance of the institution to national security.80 Yet 
the statute did not grant the organization intelligence capabilities even 
though many individuals, groups, and organizations threatening Chile’s 
internal security operate from within its prisons.81 As experts have pointed 
out, “If the Gendarmeria were to carry out intelligence in an 
institutionalized fashion, it could make a substantive contribution to the 
national security system.”82 
Interagency coordination has also been problematic. In the 2000s, Gregory 
Weeks has explained, “A serious problem facing any reformer is the 
persistently decentralized nature of Chilean intelligence. Six autonomous 
organizations work with little formal connections to each other. Each 
branch of the Armed Forces (Army, Navy and Air Force) operates its own 
agency, as do the National Police, Investigations (which is the investigative 
arm of the police) and the Directorate of Public Security and 
Information.”83 Occasionally, civilians in the Chilean government complain 
about the lack of interagency work and coordination among the agencies of 
intelligence, yet the military services deny this.84 In addition, in the existing 
competition among the four armed forces intelligence services, a “fight” is 
being waged for resources, and those succeeding in the competition get the 
largest amount of resources. What then is the incentive for cooperation? 
Also, the fact that each military intelligence agency depends exclusively on 
its own Chief of Staff inhibits cooperation with other state institutions. 
Although the current debate on security and democracy may help 
the policymakers in Santiago strike an appropriate transparency and 
effectiveness balance for their intelligence system, this is still an uncharted 
territory. Chilean governments tend to take decisions ex-post, namely after 
either a scandal or a major incident, rather than as part of a regular process 
of democratic discussion that identifies the role and place for intelligence. 
Thus, after the successful terrorist attack of 8 September 2014, when some 
Chilean anarchists placed a fire extinguisher with two kilograms of black 
gunpowder assembled as a bomb in the metro station Escuela Militar that 
detonated and killed seven people, public opinion demanded more security 
measures, including an overhaul of the Chilean intelligence system and the 
19974 Law. 
Demands were then made to grant the ANI an operational branch whose 
agents would be able to infiltrate and collect intelligence on criminal and 
terrorist organizations. The envisioned reform would be fourfold, involving 
ANI, the DID, police intelligence units, and the role of cyber.85 Some 
academics criticized the proposal of granting operative capacities to the 
ANI, fearing that its lack of appropriate training and unclear ethical 
guidelines could result in its spying on political parties.86 Also unclear was 
what responsibilities the DID would have. 
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The structure of the Chilean Military Intelligence invites a comparison 
with Spain’s 2005 decision in creating its Armed Forces Intelligence Center 
(CIFAS—Centro Inteligencia de las Fuerzas Armadas). In that regard, 
Chile’s DID should be given responsibility over strategic and operative 
intelligence, leaving only tactical intelligence to each of the three branches. 
The role of Chile’s law enforcement agencies also remains unclear. They 
have traditionally been looked down upon by the Military, with claims 
that the police lack the appropriate level of training and do not perform a 
duty equally important duty to the country. Nevertheless, the law 
enforcement agencies do share a big responsibility in the current national 
security context, where the line between security and defense cannot be 
clearly drawn. The debate on roles and responsibilities has unfortunately 
not brought about necessary reforms, not even in the aftermath of the 
serious terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015 and Belgium in 2016, among 
others.87 Besides fighting terrorism and subversive groups, intelligence is 
needed to assess economic and trade matters that directly affect Chile’s 
national interests. From this perspective, Chile needs to carefully monitor 
China’s economy in order to protect Chilean copper exports, which are the 
biggest component of Chilean foreign trade. In addition, the devaluation 
of the Chilean peso against other currencies requires that Chile focus on 
economic intelligence.88 
ASSESSING THE STATUS OF CHILE’S INTELLIGENCE DEMOCRATIZATION 
AND INTELLIGENCE CULTURE 
Chile has become one of the few fully consolidated democracies in 
Latin America: it scores 2 in Freedom House indices.89 Moreover, it has 
successful democratic civil–military relations. Nevertheless, the question can 
still be raised: Where is Chile today, in terms of democratic civilian control, 
the effectiveness of its post-dictatorial intelligence agencies, and its overall 
intelligence culture? Despite some evident progress, Chile has yet to achieve 
a truly satisfactory balance between transparency and effective intelligence, 
and an adequate level of intelligence culture. A summary of the findings of 
our study, in terms of Requirements for Civilian Control, Requirements for 
Effectiveness, and Requirements for Intelligence Culture in post-dictatorial 
Chile is presented in Table 1. We assigned values ranging from low to high 
for each requirement. 
Requirements for Control 
Chile scores “low-medium” in the Institutional Control Mechanisms 
category. Control mechanisms have been institutionalized mostly through 
the development of a legal framework, ranging from authorization laws to 
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rules and regulations on intelligence, including agencies such as ANI and the 
law enforcement agencies. Nevertheless, the limited roles of the civilian 
agencies and the influence of military intelligence, coupled with limited 
guidance and direction on the part of the executive, have ultimately failed 
to develop a robust institutional control mechanism. 
In the “Oversight” category, Chile again scores “low-medium,” mostly due 
to the legacy of its non-democratic past. While formal oversight mechanisms, 
such as the Intelligence Oversight Committee and judicial bodies exist on 
paper, they have been rather ineffective. They have provided little proactive 
oversight and rather more reactive, responding largely to media “fire 
alarms” about various scandals or intelligence failures. And, even when the 
oversight bodies have convened or begun a debate on intelligence reform, 
these efforts have essentially led nowhere. Nor have the formal oversight 
bodies had sufficient authority to monitor the activities of military 
intelligence. In addition, while the media have exposed wrongdoing in 
intelligence or the lack of actual reform, and hence deserve accolades for 
performing their duties as watchdogs of democracy, they have not had the 
power to bring about responsive government, as was the case in 
democratizing countries such as Spain and Romania. 
Chile scores “medium-high” in the Professional Norms category, given the 
recent efforts by the civilian agencies to professionalize their operations, based 
on expertise, responsibility, and corporate structure. Issues that affect 
improving intelligence professionalism remain, with the most challenging 
being the legacy of the past, especially the military’s influence on the 
intelligence sector, in which it attempts to undermine the efforts of the ANI 
and police intelligence agencies to increase the expertise of their personnel. 
Requirements for Effectiveness 
Chile scores “low-medium” in the “Plan” category. While strategic documents 
were issued after the transition to democracy, Chile’s policymakers have yet to 
develop a robust plan on the role and place of intelligence under the 
democracy. 
Chile scores “medium” in the “Institutions” category. While the country 
has an intelligence system, consisting of several agencies, some civilian and 
some military, the Chilean intelligence system is far from being a 
sophisticated, contemporary intelligence community, featuring effective 
coordination mechanisms among the agencies, healthy cooperation and 
sharing, and interoperability. 
Chile scores “medium-high” in the “Resources” category. For at least some 
of the military intelligence components, the adequacy of budget, personnel, 
and equipment has been relatively high. This may be explained by the 
Copper Law, which will soon undergo a reformation process due to recent 
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scandals wherein money was allegedly used unlawfully, including the 
financing of houses for former military intelligence personnel who were 
released from prison after serving time for human rights violations.90 The 
ANI, however, does not benefit from Copper Law funding, and its budget 
may be less than eight million dollars a year.91 
Requirements for Intelligence Culture 
Chile scores “low-medium” in the “Academia” category. Intelligence has yet 
to become an academic discipline at civilian universities, whose role would 
be to educate society about intelligence matters and erase the stigma that 
intelligence still carries. A few universities, such as the Universidad Diego 
Portales, include civil–military relations topics in their curricula, and 
thereby on intelligence, but full Intelligence Studies curricula are yet to be 
developed in the Chilean academia, and despite the burgeoning think tanks, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and research centers functioning 
in Chile, they have only moderately addressed the topic of intelligence. 
Finally, the limited literature on intelligence available in Chile is generated 
mostly by ANEPE, and less by civilian academia or civil society. 
Chile also scores “low-medium” in the “Intelligence” category. While the 
country’s intelligence agencies have developed their own education and 
training institutions, thereby helping promote security culture within the 
intelligence system, they have limited the access of civilians thus preventing 
the development of an intelligence culture among outsiders. Nor have 
Chile’s intelligence agencies developed strong linkages with academia, a 
relationship which would encourage a debate on the role of intelligence in 
Chilean democracy. As a result, the negative image of the intelligence 
agencies continues to linger. 
AN INCOMPLETE TRANSFORMATION 
Chile’s efforts to democratize its intelligence after the demise of the Pinochet 
regime have been sluggish. The requirements of civilian control of intelligence, 
intelligence effectiveness, and intelligence culture have not yet been fulfilled.92 
Chile has yet to accomplish robust democratic civilian control and 
transparency of its intelligence services, in particular the military 
intelligence. Notably, Chile’s elected officials have had limited power and 
incentives to pursue a more robust democratization of intelligence. What 
Gregory Weeks noted in 2008 is still true today: “The military’s proven 
ability to operate its own intelligence agencies constitutes a disincentive.”93 
Thus, the legacy of the past has not been entirely wiped out. Chile has yet 
to develop a robust intelligence culture, whereby both insiders and 
outsiders understand and support the role of the intelligence agencies in the 
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democracy. Limited efforts on the part of the political elites, academia, and 
even the intelligence agencies themselves to change this situation make it 
possible for “intelligence” to remain terra incognita. More problematically, 
the limited efforts on the part of the intelligence services and academia to 
educate the citizenry on the role of intelligence in a democracy continue to 
fuel the civilian population’s fear and hatred toward the intelligence sectors. 
In sum, while the noxious DINA has de facto and de jure incrementally 
disappeared from the post-Pinochet Chile, its stigma has not faded away 
from citizens’ minds and memories. 
Chile is thus an intriguingly paradoxical case of “intelligence and 
democracy,” whereby the country has achieved democratic consolidation, 
particularly in terms of free and fair elections, political pluralism, a free 
market economy, and even civil–military relations, yet without much 
progress in democratizing intelligence. The improvement of transparency, 
accountability, and civilian political control of intelligence is still a work in 
progress. Nevertheless, the intelligence agencies are now considerably 
distanced from the Pinochet-era’s ruthlessly abusive services, and this 
accomplishment is worth noting. 
REFERENCES  
1 In defining intelligence democratization by institutionalizing intelligence agencies 
that are under democratic control and effective, we consider Linz and Stepan’s 
five arenas of modern consolidated democracies. See Juan J. Linz and Alfred 
Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, 
South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore and London: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 7–15. We also consider the Gill and 
Phythian definition of intelligence and the intelligence process. See Peter Gill 
and Mark Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World (New York: Polity, 
2012), pp. 1–257.  
2 For a detailed theoretical background on intelligence culture, see: Irena Dumitru, 
“Building an Intelligence Culture From Within: The SRI and Romanian Society,” 
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 27, No. 3, Fall 
2014, pp. 569–589. Dumitru notes that the concept is circumscribed to the 
concept of “security culture,” which she defines as “a state which incorporates 
information, values, attitudes, and behaviors of social actors, which are then 
held and developed in relation to national security, threats, risks, and national 
interests.” Using examples from Spain, Italy, France, among other countries, 
she further highlights that the main function of intelligence culture “should be 
to facilitate a correct representation of national security and national interest 
endeavors, primarily as assets in the citizens’ own common benefit, in contrast 
to the negative or deformed perception often encountered in regard to 
intelligence agencies.”  
3 For detailed assessments of the success of the Chilean post-Pinochet civil–military 
relations, see Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, The Routledge 
AND  COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME  30,  NUMBER  2                                                                                                                         
CHILEAN  INTELLIGENCE  AFTER  PINOCHET  361 
Handbook of Civil–Military Relations (London: Routledge, 2012); Justin 
Nankivell, “Best Practices Crossing The Pacific: Security Sector Development 
from the Andes to Asia,” Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies; and Thomas 
C. Bruneau, “Civilians and the Military in Latin America: The Absence of 
Incentives,” Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 55, 2013, pp. 143–160.  
4 Democratic reform of intelligence is a particular component of civil–military 
relations. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, The Routledge 
Handbook of Civil–Military Relations.  
5 For demands on democratization of intelligence we use the Matei and Bruneau 
framework of democratic civilian control and effectiveness. Democratic Civilian 
Control is conceptualized in terms of authority over the institutional control 
mechanisms, oversight, and the inculcation of professional norms (although 
professional norms can also contribute to effectiveness); Effectiveness in 
Fulfilling Roles and Missions involves three necessary, yet not necessarily 
sufficient requirements of plan, structures/processes and resources, in the form 
of political capital, money, and personnel (although it is rather difficult to 
assess effectiveness, it is important to have such institutions). See Thomas C. 
Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, The Routledge Handbook of Civil– 
Military Relations; Florina Cristiana Matei, “The Media’s Role in Intelligence 
Democratization,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 
Vol. 27, No. 1, Spring 2014, pp. 73–108. For the requirements for intelligence 
culture we use Irena Dumitru’s framework, whereby the intelligence culture is 
developed at various levels and in three main areas: the intelligence community, 
academia, and business (due to lack of available data on the business 
requirement, we will drop this element from our analysis). See Irena Dumitru, 
“Building an Intelligence Culture from Within: The SRI and Romanian Society.”  
6 We understand that assessing intelligence democratization is problematic, mainly 
due to the cloistered nature of intelligence bureaucracies. Nevertheless, access to 
the existing intelligence literature, but mainly through involvement in the 
programs conducted by the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) for 
foreign military and civilian partners, and ANEPE, enables us to discuss 
intelligence reform with intelligence representatives from new democracies, 
including Chile, and allows us to be confident that we have useful insights on 
the topic. Both authors speak the language of Chile. One author lives in Chile 
and worked for the Chilean Government at the time in which the investigation 
was carried out.  
7 Pinochet became the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and was the only 
five-star general of the Armed Forces.  
8 Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, The Routledge Handbook of 
Civil–Military Relations.  
9 “Manuel Contreras and the Birth of DINA,” available at http://www. 
latinamericanstudies.org/chile/DINA-birth.htm 
10 Chile’s first intelligence gathering activities were carried out by its military 
organizations. In the early 20th century, German advisers, helping with the 
professional development of Chile’s army, contributed to the creation of the 
Department of Reconnaissance and Information. In 1964, it was renamed 
INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL  OF  INTELLIGENCE 
362 FLORINA  CRISTIANA  MATEI  AND  ANDREŚ  DE  CASTRO  GARCIÁ 
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